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Abstract: In cognitive load theory (CLT), learning is the development of cognitive 
schemas in a long-term memory with no known limits and can happen only if our 
limited working memory can process new information presented and the amount 
of information that does not contribute to learning is low. According to this theory, 
learning is optimal when instructional support is decreased going from worked 
examples via completion problem to autonomous problem solving and learners 
do not benefit from practicing retrieval with complex content. However, studies 
on productive failure and retrieval practice have provided clear evidence against 
these two guidelines. In this article, issues with CLT and research inspired by this 
theory, which remain largely ignored among cognitive load theorists but have 
likely contributed to these contradictory findings, are discussed. This article con-
cludes that these issues should make us question the usefulness of CLT in health 
science education, medical education and other complex domains, and presents 
recommendations for both educational practice and future research on the matter.
Keywords: Cognitive load theory; definitions; self-reports; retrieval practice; 
productive failure.
Resumo: Na teoria da carga cognitiva (CLT), a aprendizagem é o desenvolvimento 
de esquemas cognitivos em uma memória de longo prazo sem limites conhecidos 
e pode acontecer apenas se nossa limitada memória de trabalho puder processar 
novas informações apresentadas e a quantidade de informações que não contribui 
para a aprendizagem é baixo. De acordo com essa teoria, o aprendizado é ideal 
quando diminui o suporte instrucional, passando de exemplos trabalhados, via 
problemas de conclusão, para uma solução autônoma de problemas, e os alunos 
não se beneficiam praticando a recuperação com conteúdo complexo. No entanto, 
estudos sobre falhas produtivas e práticas de recuperação forneceram evidências 
claras contra essas duas diretrizes. Neste artigo, são discutidos problemas com 
a CLT e com pesquisas inspiradas nessa teoria, que permanecem amplamente 
ignorados entre os teóricos da carga cognitiva, mas provavelmente contribuíram 
para essas descobertas contraditórias. Este artigo conclui que essas questões 
devem nos fazer questionar a utilidade da CLT na educação em ciências da saúde, 
educação médica e outros domínios complexos e apresenta recomendações para 
a prática educacional e para pesquisas futuras sobre o assunto.
Palavras-chave: Teoria da carga cognitiva; definições; autorrelatos; prática de 
recuperação; falha produtiva.
ABREVIATIONS: CLT, Cognitive Load Theory; PF, productive failure RP, retrieval 
practice.
Introduction
Cognitive load theory (CLT) postulates that learning (1) is the development 
of cognitive schemas in long-term memory with no known limits and (2) 
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can happen only if (i) information to be processed 
is within the narrow limits of our working memory 
and (ii) the amount of information that does not 
contribute to learning is minimised (e.g., [1-4]). 
This theory has resulted in a series of guidelines 
for the design of instruction in the context of 
learning complex content or procedures (e.g., 
[5-7]), including that (1) learning is optimal when 
instructional support is decreased going from 
worked examples via completion problems to 
autonomous problem solving and (2) learners do 
not benefit from practicing retrieval with complex 
content. However, as demonstrated in the next two 
paragraphs, research on retrieval practice (RP) and 
productive failure (PF) has provided clear evidence 
against both (1) and (2). After sharing key lessons 
from that research, this article discusses ontological 
and epistemological issues with CLT that have 
likely contributed to cognitive load theorists’ 
inability to explain core findings from that research. 
Although these issues remain largely ignored 
among cognitive load theorists, they should make 
us question the usefulness of CLT in health science 
education, medical education and other complex 
domains. This article therefore concludes with a 
series of recommendations for both educational 
practice and future research on the matter.
Key lessons (1): Retrieval practice (RP)
Research on RP has consistently demonstrated 
that taking a memory test (i.e., RP) not only 
assesses what we know but also enhances 
retention, an effect that is also referred to as the 
testing effect (e.g., [8-10]). Although cognitive load 
theorists have stated that there is no testing effect 
(i.e., no benefit of RP) for complex content (e.g., 
[11]), Karpicke and Aue [8] indicated that a key 
finding from RP research has been that the testing 
effect is alive and well for complex content, and 
their response to Van Gog and Sweller [11], who 
claimed no testing effect for complex content, 
neatly summarizes some of the key flaws of 
research inspired by CLT. 
To start, a core assumption in CLT is that 
information to be processed imposes a load on 
working memory, which is also referred to as 
cognitive load, and that load depends on how many 
new elements of information (i.e., not yet stored in 
cognitive schemas to be retrieved from long-term 
memory) must be processed as well as how these 
elements are interrelated (element interactivity). If 
the total number of new elements to be processed 
plus their interactions exceeds the narrow limits of 
working memory, cognitive overload occurs. The 
problem with the concept of element interactivity 
is that it is not defined in any measurable way, and 
consequently, cognitive load and overload are not 
defined in such a way either. Besides, although 
element interactivity is recognised as a key factor 
in cognitive load, it is rarely clear how element 
interactivity is manipulated in experiments inspired 
by CLT. And in many experiments, it may not be an 
important factor after all (e.g., memorising isolated 
words or single sentences). Finally, a common 
pitfall in research inspired by CLT is that small 
sample sizes leave researchers (very) unlikely 
to detect differences of a practically relevant 
magnitude (e.g., half a standard deviation) and 
yet researchers erroneously interpret statistically 
non-significant outcomes as evidence in favour 
of “no difference”. Using Bayesian methods, which 
– contrary to null hypothesis significance testing 
– can help researchers to establish evidence 
in favour of one hypothesis relative to one or 
several other hypotheses, Karpicke and Aue [8] 
indicated that their small-scale meta-analysis 
provides substantial evidence in favour of a small 
positive testing effect relative to the null hypothesis 
of no testing effect.
Key lessons (2): Productive failure (PF)
A second key statement from CLT is that 
learning is optimal when instructional support 
is decreased going from worked examples via 
completion problems to autonomous problem 
solving. CLT predicts that novices will likely 
face cognitive overload if asked to engage in 
autonomous problem solving in a complex 
domain without studying worked examples first, 
and there are studies that appear to provide 
some evidence in favour of that prediction (e.g., 
[12-13]). However, participants in these studies 
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worked individually, and focussed on learning 
rules that would not be agreed as “complex” by 
everyone, such as learning how to apply basic 
rules from probability calculus to calculate a 
conditional probability. Besides, studies inspired 
by PF have provided evidence for the notion that, 
at least under some conditions, initial struggle 
with complex content in the absence of high 
instructional support (i.e., worked examples, or 
very detailed instructions making the problem 
easier) can benefit learning (e.g., [14-18]). 
Although many prominent cognitive load 
theorists have waived away this finding by arguing 
that these studies mainly focussed on “low element 
interactivity” material and therefore CLT and PF could 
equally well explain the findings, the absence of 
measures of element interactivity does not facilitate 
this argument, and the materials reported in for 
example [15-17] are not any less complex (perhaps 
on the contrary: somewhat more complex) than the 
ones used in the studies that found evidence in 
favour of studying worked examples before solving 
problems autonomously (e.g., [12-13]). 
A key factor that has remained largely ignored 
in research inspired by CLT is learning from peers, 
in dyads or small groups; experiments designed 
from a CLT perspective have almost exclusively 
focussed on participants learning individually, 
and often so in laboratory settings in which the 
participants did not really have any stake in the 
outcome (e.g., no course in biology, programming 
or probability calculus coming up next). Yet, based 
on the literature on PF thus far, it appears that 
learning from peers may constitute a critical factor 
in PF. It is therefore surprising that most cognitive 
load theorists continue to dismiss the work on 
PF as focussing on “low element interactivity” 
content only, whatever that means given the 
lack of a clear definition and good measure of 
element interactivity, and that even in a recent 
proposal to move from CLT to collaborative CLT 
[19] there is no single mention of PF. Given that the 
apparent contradiction between findings from PF 
research and predictions made by CLT has been 
discussed at several platforms before, including 
by prominent cognitive load theorists (e.g., [14]), 
one would expect at least some consideration of 
future research comparing individual learning and 
learning from peers to see where and why CLT 
and PF provide different predictions and which 
ones are more likely under which conditions. 
Hardcore cognitive load theorists state that 
there is more than half a century of research 
literature supporting direct instruction over more 
constructivist approaches such as PF, but most 
of the research indicating a preference towards 
direct instruction is based on laboratory studies 
quite isolated from everyday educational practice, 
involving small samples of participants studying 
content of questionable complexity individually 
without having a stake in the outcome of the 
experiment. However, in settings where the nature 
of tasks and problems, and professionals’ roles 
and responsibilities with it, are dynamic and ever-
evolving – such as security, emergency medicine, 
aviation, mental health, and engineering [20] 
– professionals have to be willing and able to 
learn new content and skill all the time and direct 
instruction may often not be an option but PF as in 
learning from peers may be critical. In laboratory 
settings where undergraduate students learn 
how to apply a multiplication rule to calculate a 
probability, cognitive overload may never occur; 
if a participant gets bored or thinks the problem is 
too difficult or not worth the investment, there may 
hardly be any cognitive load at all. However, in 
high-stakes settings like the ones just mentioned, 
cognitive overload will at times pose a real threat, 
and a lack of willingness to invest in a task or 
problem can have grave consequences for human 
lives. Even small positive effects of RP and/or PF 
may in such settings make a difference between 
life and death. 
The direct instruction advocated by CLT and 
(most of) its followers is not without problems. 
To start, a lack of prior knowledge may hinder 
learners to understand complex problems, how 
they manifest, how they can be represented in 
a way that we can approach and try to solve 
them, and/or methods to solve these problems. 
Besides, when these problems are presented in an 
artificially (well-)structured manner, learners may 
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not come to fully understand the nature of these 
problems, how they manifest, how they can be 
represented in a way that we can approach and 
try to solve them, and what methods we can use 
to solve these problems under what conditions. 
PF aims to circumvent these problems by having 
students generate and explore the potential 
and limitations of different representations of a 
type of problem – say Type X – and methods to 
solve Type X (i.e., Phase 1) to then provide them 
with opportunities to establish useful rules for 
representing and solving Type X (i.e., Phase 2). 
When we design learning and practice tasks 
around Type X that are of an appropriate level 
of complexity, in a context that is challenging 
(though not frustrating), Phase 1 can help learners 
to activate and apply prior knowledge of concepts 
that are important to understand Type X, to draw 
attention to critical characteristics of concepts 
and Type X, to explain and elaborate these 
characteristics, and both Phase 1 and Phase 2 
can create a safe space for students to explore, 
generate, make mistakes, and learn and practice 
with methods to approach and solve Type X.
Knowledge as static vs. as dynamic
The key notion in CLT that learning is the 
development of cognitive schemas in long-term 
memory is somehow based on the assumption 
that content to be learned is something static 
that can be captured in schemas which can then 
be retrieved from long-term memory. However, 
high-stakes settings like the ones in the previous 
paragraph have in common that the nature of 
knowledge, tasks, and problems is dynamic and 
ever-evolving. With the advancement of science 
and technology, many things learned once upon 
a time turn out to be less useful than expected 
or lose their usefulness because the nature of 
problems, roles and responsibilities has changed. 
Apart from these high-stakes settings, let us 
take learning and maintaining a foreign language 
as an example. From personal experience, most of 
us can tell that grammar structures and proverbs in 
a foreign language once learned become rusty and 
may be retrieved with error (i.e., incorrect memories) 
if we do not (continue to) use that foreign language 
regularly. Using that foreign language regularly, 
with native or otherwise fluent speakers, provides 
a natural form of RP. Besides, language evolves; 
new words and proverbs are born, and the use of 
grammar structures may change with time as well, 
and that RP of using the language with others can 
help us to adapt to these changes. In this respect, 
knowledge is not necessarily exclusively about 
something “out there” for us to learn but is at 
least to some extent also cocreated in dialogue 
and conversation. Finally, we do not need to see 
a worked example or completion problem for any 
new grammar structure or proverb; in line with 
PF, much of it is learned while “struggling” in a 
conversation with others.
Definitions and poor methodological 
practice
As mentioned earlier, the concepts of element 
interactivity, cognitive load, and cognitive overload 
– key concepts in CLT – are poorly defined and 
good measures are lacking. In fact, the dominant 
measurement practice since 1992 has been to have 
participants self-report on a nine-point scale how 
much mental effort they invested in a task that just 
completed [21-22], depending on the study either 
once at the end of a learning and/or post-test stage 
or several times (i.e., repeatedly) during a learning 
and/or post-test stage, for instance after each of a 
series of tasks. This practice has persisted despite 
repeated critiques, including perfect confounding 
of measurement error, differences in tasks in which 
it is used, and a likely shift in participants’ response 
from one task to the next [23]. A robust rule from 
psychometrics is that that single self-report items 
can be incredibly noisy (i.e., large measurement error) 
and are usually much noisier than measurements 
obtained from series of items on the same variable 
of interest. Task differences may make it difficult to 
compare ratings from different tasks not in the last 
place because our willingness to invest mental 
effort in a given task may well depend on how 
many tasks we have seen before and how much 
effort we invested in each of these. Finally, response 
shift is a real issue because our conceptions of 
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task complexity as well as our self-assessments of 
what we are capable of may change as we learn. 
Newcomers in a complex topic are often poor 
self-assessors in that topic (e.g., [24]); this is a skill 
to be improved with practice. If when seeing a 
counterintuitive probability problem for the first time 
we think it is easy and therefore invest little mental 
effort, then learn about the solution and steps to 
be taken towards the solution and realise it is more 
difficult than anticipated, we may invest more mental 
effort in a second problem of the same type not 
because the second problem is more complex but 
because we now have a better appreciation of some 
initially “hidden” complexities or difficulties and we 
have become more aware of the limitations of our 
probability problem solving skills. 
To account for a range of empirical findings 
that could not be explained only in terms of a 
general “cognitive load” or mental effort invested, 
cognitive load theorists introduced different types 
of cognitive load, some of which linking to for 
learning not effective load (i.e., “bad” load) some of 
which potentially stimulating learning (i.e., “good” 
load). It is beyond the scope of this article to 
provide a detailed review of these different types 
of load and how different scholars have attempted 
to define and measure these types of load, but this 
work has been done already anyway (e.g., [1-5, 20, 
23]) and can be briefly summarised as follows. On 
the one hand, there are cognitive load theorists 
who state that we need three types of cognitive 
load: load arising from essential aspects of the 
task (intrinsic), load due to non-essential aspects 
of the task (extraneous), and load arising from the 
deliberate engagement in learning (germane) (e.g., 
[7, 25]). On the other hand, there are scholars who 
state that germane load is that part of the intrinsic 
load that results in learning (i.e., not all intrinsic 
load results in learning); from this perspective, 
germane load is therefore not a third independent 
type of load but part of intrinsic load (e.g., [2, 
5, 20, 26]). Along with this lack of consensus in 
definitions, we have seen the development and 
use of a variety of self-report questionnaires (e.g., 
[12, 27-30]) which all attempt to measure two or 
three types of load but with somewhat different 
wording. Each of these questionnaires suffers 
from question wording effects, suffers from the 
same task differences and response shift issues 
as the mental effort self-report item, and all beg 
the same question: if we cannot even properly 
define element interactivity or cognitive load let 
alone agree on the number and definitions of 
types of load, what on earth are we measuring?
Despite the disagreement on definitions and 
measurement, researchers continue to use their 
own definitions and measurement tools without 
mention of alternative views, as if no one ever 
questioned for instance the role of germane 
load or any of the issues with the use of self-
report measurements. They usually do so in 
small-sample experiments with questionable 
manipulations of element interactivity or cognitive 
load that leave the reader with a variety of possible 
alternative explanations for the findings reported. A 
recent example of this comes from Lehmann and 
Seufert [25], who with 42 learners in a 2x2 between-
subjects design (i.e., 42 learners divided into four 
groups) claim to have found evidence in favour of 
tailoring instruction to learners’ preferred learning 
styles, despite very clear evidence against that 
idea (e.g., [31]). However, there are several possible 
alternative explanations for this finding in favour 
of learning styles, including the following. 
To start, it is well known that in samples as small 
as the one at hand findings can vary wildly from 
one experiment to another, and while individual 
experiments might indicate a clear effect in 
one direction in an accidental sample across 
experiments there might be no difference at all 
or even a clear difference in the other direction 
(e.g., [31]). Statistically significant outcomes in 
one experiment may not be replicated in a future 
study, and statistically non-significant outcomes 
cannot be interpreted as evidence in favour of 
no difference (e.g., “there are no main effects” 
or “there is no interaction effect”). Even if the 
statistical power of a statistical test for a particular 
effect of interest in each of two independent 
experiments carried out under exactly the same 
conditions is high, provided the anticipated effect 
(of a given size) exists, the chance of establishing 
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a statistically significant outcome in both 
experiments is the product of the statistical power 
of the two experiments (e.g., [23]). For example, if 
in two experiments we achieve a power of 0.80, 
the chance of obtaining a statistically significant 
outcome in both experiments is 0.80 x 0.80 = 
0.64, or 64%. In CLT research, sample sizes are 
often such that for an effect of for instance half 
a standard deviation the appropriate statistical 
test has a statistical power of around 0.50. With 
such a low power, the chance of a statistically 
significant finding for the effect of interest in 
two independent experiments, if the anticipated 
effect (of the size specified) exists, is only 25% (!). 
Yet, interpretations of statistically non-significant 
outcomes such as “there is no effect” are all over 
the place in CLT research.
Lehmann and Seufert asked learners to indicate 
their preference for either auditive or visual 
texts, and they found that among learners with 
a preference for visual text the ones given visual 
texts on average learned more than their peers 
who were given auditive texts. However, as they 
themselves recognise, most texts in everyday life 
are presented visually, so an increased closeness 
to real life may be a much more likely explanation 
for this finding than tailoring materials to learners’ 
preferred learning styles. Furthermore, there is 
another potentially obvious confounder: reading 
skills. What if the participants who indicated 
a preference towards visual texts happen to 
have been the ones with better reading skills 
compared to the ones who indicated a preference 
towards auditive texts? When having to process 
information, competence and preference often 
go together, and if that is the case here, the ones 
with better reading skills may more frequently 
have indicated a visual preference than the 
ones with somewhat poorer reading skills. The 
finding that the presentation of visual texts on 
average resulted in better outcomes in the 
“visual preference” group than in the “auditive-
ambiguous preference” group may then largely 
if not exclusively reflect a difference in reading 
skills rather than a difference in (whether or not 
tailoring to) style per se. 
To conclude
Two key statements from CLT are that (1) learning 
is optimal when instructional support is decreased 
going from worked examples via completion 
problems to autonomous problem solving and (2) 
learners do not benefit from practicing retrieval 
with complex content. However, research inspired 
by PF has provided evidence against (1) while 
research on RP has provided evidence against 
(2). An immediate recommendation for teachers 
and others involved in educational practice is 
to not consider CLT – or any educational theory 
for that matter – as the holy grail providing the 
whole “truth” and nothing but the truth about 
what works and what does not work in education, 
but to consider the robust findings on PF and RP 
as well. One of the key contributors (if not the 
most important contributor) to PF may be having 
learners working in dyads or small groups to learn 
from each other. This is a possibility that should 
be investigated further in both laboratory and 
actual educational settings. Learning from peers 
may involve learning new things but may equally 
function as a form of RP. Future studies could 
experiment with this possibility to determine under 
what conditions RP may contribute to or diminish 
any potential PF effects. 
The suggestion that CLT is a useless theory that 
can now be placed in the museum of dead theories 
is neither the message nor the intention of this 
article. However, to assess the continued relevance 
of CLT as a key contributor to educational research 
and practice, more cognitive load theorists should 
take note of critical arguments that have been 
made for quite a while now. Specifically, findings 
from research on PF and RP that contradict core 
predictions from CLT, critiques on the lack of 
definition and good measures and the lack of 
consensus on these questions in the cognitive 
load community, and recommendations for good 
methodological and statistical practice such as 
striving for larger samples and refraining from 
interpreting statistically non-significant findings as 
evidence of “no difference”. If we take these points 
together, we may in the next years learn much 
more about conditions under which CLT, PF, and 
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RP converge, under which conditions they diverge, 
and what are the best possible recommendations 
for educational practice and further research based 
on this convergence and divergence.
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